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FEEDING TUBES, SLIPPERY SLOPES,
AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
David Orentlicher, M,D,, J,D.*
Christopher M, Callahan, M,D,
INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, articles in the New England Journal of Medicine,' the
Journal ofthe American Medical Association,^ and the Journal ofthe Amer-
ican Geriatrics Society^ have suggested that feeding tubes are substantially
overused in patients with advanced dementia or other serious illnesses. Con-
trary to common understanding, artificial feeding often does not improve the
patient's nutrition or ability to function,'' The feeding tube, in fact, may not
be providing any benefit to the patient in terms of length or quality of life.
Although the overuse of feeding tubes is troubling in some respects, it
is reassuring in one important way. It indicates that slippery slope concerns
about the "right to die" may be exaggerated. Some commentators resisted on
slippery slope grounds the recognition of a right for patients to forgo artificial
nutrition and hydration. According to those commentators, laws permitting
* Samuel R, Rosen Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for Law and Health, Indiana University School
of Law-Indianapolis, Adjunct Professor of Medicine, Indiana University School of Medicine, and Core
Faculty, Indiana University Center for Bioethics. Address correspondence to Dr Orentlicher at Indiatia
School of Law-Indianapolis, 530 W, New York Street, Indianapolis, IN 46202-3225 or via e-mail at
dorentli@iupui.edu. We are grateful for (he research assistance of Joseph S. Wooldridge.
+ Director, Indiana University Center for Aging; Scientist, Regenstrief Institute for Health Care, Indiana
University School of Medicine,
' Muriel R. Gillick, Rethinking the Role of Tube Feeding in Patients with Advanced Dementia, 342 NEW
ENG. J, MED. 206 (2000),
^ Susan L. Mitchell et al,. Clinical and Organizational Factors Associated with Feeding Tube Use Among
Nursing Home Residents with Advanced Cognitive Impairment, 290 J.A.M.A, 73 (2003); Thomas E,
Finucane et al.. Tube Feeding in Patients with Advanced Dementia: A Review ofthe Evidence, 282
J.A,M,A. 1365(1999),
' Christopher M. Callahan et al,. Outcomes of Percutaneous Endoscopic Castrostomy Among Older
Adults in a Community Setting, 48 J, AM, GERIATR. SOC'Y 1048 (2000); Thomas E. Finucane & Colleen
Christmas, More Caution About Tube Feeding, 48 J, AM. GERtATR. SOC'Y 1167 (2000).
"• Gillick, supra note 1; Mitchell et al,, supra note 2; Finucane et al,, supra note 2; Callahan et at., supra
note 3,
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the discontinuation of artificial feeding could not be enacted without opening
up patients to a serious risk of abuse. The legal option to refuse artificial
nutrition and hydration would become a duty to refuse them.^
The overuse of feeding tubes provides important evidence for the view
that extensions ofthe right to refuse life-sustaining treatment can occur with-
out a slide down the slippery slope. Patients, families, and physicians appar-
ently are reluctant to take action they think will hasten a patient's death, even
if the action is permitted by law.* This reassuring finding is important for its
own sake. Society needs to be alert to the possibility of premature terminations
of life-sustaining treatment. Fortunately, it appears that feeding tubes are not
being discontinued too soon.
The finding also may be important in terms of its implications for the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide. Just as many commentators argued
that laws permitting withdrawals and withholdings of feeding tubes would
result in abuse, so, too, do many commentators oppose a right to assisted
suicide on the ground that it would not be limited to the few compelling cases in
which it might be morally acceptable. Yet, if patients, families, and physicians
are reluctant to engage in legally permissible withholdings or withdrawals of
life-sustaining treatment, we might expect patients and physicians to be even
more reluctant to engage in legally permissible physician-assisted suicide.
Before we develop our arguments in more depth, a clarifying point is in
order. We are not taking a position on the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide. We are, in fact, divided on that question.
I. FEEDING TUBES AND THEIR VALUE FOR PATIENTS
Perhaps because the value of artificial feeding seems intuitively obvious,
the empirical literature is relatively sparse on the question of whether feeding
tubes are beneficial for seriously and irreversibly ill patients. Most studies have
involved retrospective chart reviews, and none of the prospective studies have
involved a randomization of patients between tube feeding and oral feeding.^
At one time, tube feeding was provided exclusively by naso-gastric tubes
that were inserted into the stomach by passing them through the nose, throat,
and esophagus. While naso-gastric tubes are still used for short-term feeding,
they have been replaced for long-term feeding by gastrostomy tubes. Gas-
trostomy tubes cause less discomfort for the patient, and they entail fewer
complications than naso-gastric tubes (such as erosion ofthe nasal tissue and
aspiration pneumonia).
' Daniel Callahan, On Peeding the Dying, 13(5) HASTINGS CEN, REP. 22 (1983); Mark Siegler & Alan
J. Weisbard, Against the Emerging Stream: Shouid Fiuids and Nutritional Support Be Discontinued?,
145 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 129 (1985).
* Callahan et al., supra note 3.
^ Finucane et al., supra note 2; Callahan et al., supra note 3.
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Originally, gastrostomy tubes were inserted into the stomach during a
surgical procedure that required the cutting of an opening into the abdominal
wall, Dr, Michael Gauderer and his colleagues then developed the percuta-
neous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) procedure in 1979,* which requires only
two small incisions into the abdominal wall (much like laparoscopic surgery
now has supplanted open abdominal surgery for most gall bladder removals),
Gauderer reported that his experiences with high complication rates
among children undergoing surgical gastrostomy motivated his research to
find a safer alternative. Over the past 25 years, Gauderer and other scientists
have demonstrated clearly that the PEG procedure is safer and associated with
fewer complications than open gastrostomies. In reflecting on the success of
this procedure, Gauderer notes that "in part because of its simplicity and low
complication rate, this minimally invasive procedure also lends itself to over-
utilization,'" He suggests that "much of our effort in the future needs to be
directed toward the ethical aspects associated with long-term enteral feeding
[because] , , , we as physicians must continuously strive to demonstrate that
our interventions truly benefit the patient,'""
One of the difficulties in understanding the benefits of PEG is the im-
plicit assumption that, if the procedure provides nutrition and is safe, then it
must be beneficial for those unable to eat because nutrition is so fundamental
to health and recovery from illness. Over the past two decades, patients, clini-
cians, caregivers, and scientists have increasingly challenged this assumption.
Most of the early research on PEG focused on short-term operative compli-
cation rates. Then, case reports and editorials began to surface about patients
or patient groups who were harmed or endured prolonged suffering because
of artificial feeding. These reports were followed by retrospective studies
examining mortality and longer-term complication rates among older adults
receiving PEG, Eventually, long-term prospective studies examining nutri-
tional, functional, and quality of life outcomes were conducted. These studies
demonstrated the limited beneficial effects of PEG among some older adults
receiving the procedure, and particularly those with dementia. Here, we re-
view the empirical evidence addressing the clinical outcomes of older adults
receiving percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy.
Until the mid-1990s, most studies reporting on the outcomes of PEG
focused on the operative and peri-operative complications rates. This was un-
derstandable, given the clinical motivation for the early development of the
procedure and the focus on decreasing the complication rate associated with
** Michael L. Gauderer, Twenty Years of Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy: Origin and Evolution
of a Concept and Its Expanded Applications, 50 GASTROtNTESTiNAL ENDOSCOPY 879 (1999); Miehael L.
Gauderer et al,, Gastrostomy Without Laparotomy: A Percutaneous Endoscopic Technique, 15 J. PED.
SuRO. 872 (1980),
' Gauderer, supra tiote 8, at 882,
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open gastrostomies. Most of these studies relied on data from retrospective
chart reviews of patients undergoing the procedure at major academic medical
centers. In a review of 48 such studies, Wollman and colleagues reported a
95.7% success rate for PEG placement." Major complications occurred in
9.4% of patients, minor complications in 5.9%, and tube-related complica-
tions in 16%.'^ Thus, the procedure clearly was safe in terms of peri-operative
complications. However, Wollman also reported a 30-day mortality rate of
14.7% across all studies.'^ Although these deaths did not appear to be re-
lated to the procedure, this finding provided some early indications about the
magnitude of competing morbidities among this patient population.
In 1997, Rabeneck and collaborators reported patient outcomes from a
retrospective review of patients who received PEG in Veterans Affairs hos-
pitals between 1990 and 1992."* The authors identified 7,369 veterans who
had received a PEG for cerebrovascular disease, other neurologic disease, or
cancer.'^  The complication rate was reported as low (4%), but the scientists re-
ported 23.5% in-hospital mortality."' Furthermore, the median survival ofthe
cohort receiving PEG was only 7.5 months.'^ The authors suggested that the
high mortality rate was related to the patients' underlying disease rather than
the procedure, but raised the question of the utility of the procedure among
patients who were terminally ill.'* In a similar study using claims data from
hospitalized Medicare beneficiaries. Grant and colleagues reported mortality
rates among 81,105 Medicare beneficiaries receiving gastrostomy in 1991."
The authors reported a 30-day mortality rate of 23.9%.^" Mortality increased
to 63% at one year and 81.3% at three years.^'
In one of the first prospective studies specifically designed to examine
nutritional and long-term patient outcomes following PEG, Loser and col-
laborators completed a four-year study of 210 patients receiving PEG in a
German hospital.^ ^ Body weight among the survivors in this cohort of pa-
tients increased a mean of 3.5 kilograms in the first year and almost 20% of
' ' Bruce Wollman et al., Radiologic, Endoscopic, and Surgical Gastrostomy: An Institutional Evaluation
and Meta-Analysis ofthe Literature, 197 RADIOLOGY 669, 701 (1995).
'3 W. at 702.
''' Linda Rabeneck et al., Long-Term Outcomes of Patients Receiving Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastros-
tomy Tubes, 11 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 287 (1996).
'^  Id at 288.
'«Id at 289.
'*W. at 291-92.
" Mark D. Grant et al., Gastrostomy Placement and Mortality Among Hospitalized Medicare Beneficia-
ries, 279 J.A.M.A. 1973 (1998).
2°W. at 1974, table 3.
21 W.
^^  Christian Loser et al., Enteral Long-Term Nutrition via Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy in 210
Patients, 43 DIGESTIVE Dis. Sci. 2549 (1998).
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surviving patients returned to oral feeding." These authors also reported that
83% of patients reported excellent acceptability ofthe procedure,^'' Although
this patient cohort was younger than the VA and Medicare cohorts, mortality
in the Loser and colleagues study was 27% at 30 days and 66% at one year."
Notably, this study did not include older adults with dementing disorders.
Callahan and colleagues conducted the first prospective study among
all older adults receiving PEG in a defined community in order to identify
a truly representative sample of older adults receiving the procedure.^ '^  As-
sembling the patient population in this manner provides greater assurance
that all older adults receiving the procedure are included. Studies limited to
outcomes among patients who survive the initial hospitalization may miss as
many as 30% of the patients undergoing the procedure, because those pa-
tients die before they leave the hospital. Studies limited to a single academic
medical center or hospital suffer from the selection biases that determine how
patients come to receive the procedure at that particular site. For example,
some tertiary medical centers may attract the most complicated patients and
thus report higher mortality rates. Studies relying on national claims data are
able to capture complication rates and mortality for a nationally representa-
tive sample, but typically cannot monitor nutritional parameters or functional
status.
By monitoring the practice of all gastroenterologists in a small commu-
nity in Indiana, Callahan and colleagues were able to identify 150 patients
age 60 and older who had a PEG tube placed over a 15-month period. The
mean age was 78.9 ± 8.1 (range 60-98), 56% were women, and 83.3% were
white," The mean Cumulative Illness Rating Scale score for this group of
patients was higher than any other group reported in the literature, demon-
strating the high burden of chronic illness among this cohort.^ '* About half of
the PEGs were placed during the course of care for an acute hospitalization
and the other half were placed among chronically ill patients receiving care
in the community. The most frequent indications for the PEG were stroke
(40,7%), neurodegenerative disorders (34.7%), and cancer (13.3%), Among
remaining patients (11.3%), the most frequent indication was prevention of
aspiration pneumonia.^'
There were 24 patients among the original 150 who could not undergo
the detailed study assessment because they died precipitously following the
" Id. at 2552-53,
^'' Id. at 2554,
" Id. at 2555.
^* Callahan et al,, supra note 3; Christopher M, Callahan et al,, Decision-Making for Percutaneous En-
doscopic Gastroslomy Among Older Adults in a Community Setting, 47 J, AM, GERIATR, SOC'Y 1105
(1999),
^'' Callahan et al,, supra note 3, at 1050,
28 W,
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procedure.^" Among the patients surviving long enough to complete the base-
line assessment, the majority reported severe impairment in their abilities to
perform basic activities of daily living such as toileting, dressing, and bathing.
Almost two-thirds of patients could not communicate verbally at the time of
PEG. Among those capable of communication, the majority could not pro-
vide data for self-reported subjective health status measures because of severe
cognitive impairment.^' Thus, these data had to be collected from their care-
givers. This finding highlights the limited capacity of many of these older
adults to participate in their medical decision-making, including the decision
to proceed with PEG.
The 30-day mortality among all patients undergoing the PEG procedure
was 22% and 12-month mortality was 50%.'^ Among the 72 patients surviving
at least 60 days, there were no changes in mean values of nutrition, physical
function, cognitive function, mood, pain, or quality of life. Only rarely did
patients experience improvement in functional or nutritional status.^ ^ The
study also examined the process of care and found, perhaps surprisingly, that
more than half of patients receiving PEG continued to receive food, liquids, or
medications by mouth. One-third had to have the PEG tube replaced during the
follow-up period. Nearly all patients reported PEG-related symptoms, such as
vomiting and diarrhea, and many received treatment with sedative-hypnotics
and narcotic analgesics.'" In sum, the study findings depict older adults in the
terminal stages of illness receiving the PEG in a perhaps desperate attempt
to improve function and longevity or reverse the course of the illness. There
clearly were patients in this cohort who did benefit from PEG, but the study was
not large enough to begin to identify those patient characteristics that portend
a favorable outcome. The definition of a favorable outcome can easily become
a mercurial concept and some researchers have argued that PEG simply may
provide for a more comfortable death. This does not, however, appear to be
the reason that caregivers seek a PEG tube.
Callahan and colleagues reported patients' and caregivers' expecta-
tions for benefits from PEG tube feeding among the same cohort of patients
described above." Either patients or their surrogate decision-makers com-
pleted a semi-structured, face-to-face interview to map out the information-
gathering process, expectations, and discussants involved in the decision to
proceed with gastrostomy feeding.'' Physicians completed a written question-
naire to determine their likelihood of recommending PEG tube placement.
50 M.
32 W.
" Id at 1050 & 1052, table 2.
'"W. at 1050 & 1053, table 3.
3^  Callahan et al., supra note 26.
1106.
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their involvement in the decision-making and recommendation process, and
sources of perceived pressure in the decision-making." Patients or their sur-
rogate decision-makers reported that they discussed the decision to proceed
with PEG with multiple people prior to accepting the procedure.'* Often,
these decision-makers sought the advice of family or friends who had a health
care background. Decision-makers complained that they had to make their
decisions based on incomplete information and reported considerable dis-
tress in arriving at the decision to proceed with artificial feeding. The de-
cision for gastrostomy often appeared to be a "non-decision" in the sense
that decision-makers perceived few, if any, alternatives." Physicians also re-
ported considerable distress in arriving at recommendations to proceed with
PEG, including perceived pressures from families or other health care pro-
fessionals. Providers whom the patient or caregiver identified as the primary
care physician often reported that they were not intimately involved in the
decision-making process.''" These physicians had definable patterns of triage
for PEG, but the assumptions underlying these pattems are not well supported
by the medical literature (for instance, prevention of aspiration pneumonia)."'
Decision-makers listed improved nutrition as the goal of PEG tube feed-
ing in 70% of the cases. Other reasons included a desire to increase patient
comfort (22%), extend life (18%), increase strength (14%), and help over-
come an acute illness (10%)."^ Because data on these patients' long-term
functional outcomes were lacking, decision-makers appeared to focus primar-
ily on the short-term safety of the procedure and the potential for improved
nutrition. Callahan and colleagues suggested that the interviews with decision-
makers belied "apervasive climate of 'inevitability' in thejudgment to proceed
with the artificial feeding.'"" Decision-makers simply saw no other reasonable
alternatives.
Economic incentives also may play a role in medical decision-making
about PEG tubes. Again using the cohort of older adults receiving PEG from
the defined community, Callahan and colleagues estimated the economic costs
of PEG tube feeding over one year."^  Patients were interviewed at baseline
and every two months for one year to obtain information on the use of enteral
formula, complication rates, and health services. Inpatient charge data for all
hospitalizations and PEG-related procedures for one year were obtained from
the health care systems serving the defined community. Outpatient costs were
. at 1106-07.
. at 1107.
""W. at II07& 1108, table 1.
"'/(/.at 1107.
"2 Callahan et al., supra note 3, at 1052.
"3 Callahan et al., supra note 26, at 1107.
"" Christopher M. Callahan et al.. Healthcare Costs Associated with Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastros-
tomy Among Older Adults in a Defined Community, 49 J. AM. GERIATR. SOC'Y 1525 (2001).
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estimated using volume data and customary charges for Medicare ambulatory
visits."^ Data collection was concluded at the time of the patient's death or
one year post-PEG. The mean number of days of PEG tube feeding was 180
(range 5 to 365)."* The average annual cost for PEG tube feeding for this
cohort of patients was $7,488 (median $3,691) in 1997 dollars. The average
daily cost of PEG tube feeding was $87.21 (median $33.50). The estimated
cost of providing one year of feeding via PEG is $31,832 (median $12,227)."^
The main components of these costs included the initial PEG procedure
(accounting for 29.4% of total costs), enteral formula (24.9% of total costs),
and hospital charges for major complications (33.4% of total costs). There
was considerable variation in charges among patients due to the cost of rare
but expensive major complications. Using cost estimates from the literature,
the authors then compared the cost of PEG tube feeding to hand feeding and
found little evidence that PEG tube feeding accounted for lower total costs.
However, feeding patients via PEG resulted in cost shifts affecting the interests
of the primary payer. Because PEG costs are primarily borne by third party
payers such as Medicare and hand feeding is reimbursed only through the daily
charges allowed for skilled facility care (or is provided by informal caregivers
among those living in the community), there may be financial incentives for
skilled facilities to favor PEG tube feeding.
In 2001, Dharmarajan and colleagues conducted a systematic review of
the literature to summarize research on the outcomes of PEG in older patients
with dementia."'* They noted the absence of randomized trials of PEG tube
feeding as compared to altemative methods such as hand feeding. Among 19
studies reporting patient outcomes, 11 studies had been published in the prior
three years."' The Dharmarajan and colleagues review described the low rate
of serious short-term complications, but a high 30-day mortality (~25%)."'
None of the reviewed studies demonstrated significant improvement in nu-
tritional parameters, prevention of aspiration pneumonia, pressure sores, or
infections, and some studies found the PEG tubes actually could increase
the likelihood of these complications." None ofthe reviewed studies demon-
strated improvement in functional status, comfort, or quality of life." Again,
some studies suggested a decline in comfort with the use of PEG tubes. The
authors concluded: "Although tube feeding may not be totally futile in all
"^/(i. at 1526-27.
"*/rf. atl527.
"' /d. at 1528, table 1.
"* Thiruvinvamalai S. Dharmarajan et al.. Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy and Outcome in De-
mentia, 96 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOOY 2556 (2001).
" ' Id at 2557.
^° Id at 2557-58.
5'/rf. at 2559-60.
" Id at 2560.
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cases, an analysis of the benefits and risks seldom leads to a definite positive
result in cognitively impaired individuals.""
In sum, the studies generally suggest that patients, families, and physi-
cians misjudge the benefits derived from tube feeding. Recall, for example,
the prospective PEG study in a small community. Researchers found that, of
the patients who survived at least 60 days, more than two-thirds had no sig-
nificant improvement in functional, nutritional, or subjective health status.^"
Other studies also have failed to detect improvements in functional or nutri-
tional status, and they have not found any improvement in survival for patients
with advanced dementia." In the SUPPORT study, artificial feeding was as-
sociated with increased survival in coma patients but decreased survival in
patients with acute kidney failure, multiple organ system failure, cirrhosis of
the liver, or COPD."
Tube feeding often is advocated to reduce the risk of aspiration
pneumonia,^' but studies in patients with advanced dementia have not shown
that it reduces that risk.^ * Indeed, gastrostomy tube placement may increase the
risk that the stomach contents will refiux into the esophagus, and some stud-
ies have found that tube feeding increases the risk of aspiration pneumonia.''
Other purported benefits from artificial nutrition also have not materialized.
Tube feeding has neither enhanced the healing of existing pressure sores nor
prevented the formation of new sores. It also has not reduced the overall risk
of infection.**
Although artificial feeding may be desired to ensure the comfort of a
patient, that goal often is beyond the reach of feeding tubes. Patients often
are restrained, either physically or with sedating drugs, to prevent them from
pulling their tubes out, and this can be distressing to them.*' Artificial feeding
also can deprive patients of the pleasure they experience from eating.'^ In
short, it appears that feeding tubes are being used in many patients without
any real benefit to them.
"/rf. at 2561.
" Callahan et al., supra note 3, at 1052, table 2.
^' Finucane et al., supra note 2.
'* Marie L. Borutn et al.. The Effect ofNutritional Supplementation on Survival in Seriously III Hospitalized
Adults: An Evaluation ofthe SUPPORT Data, 48 J. AM. GERIAT. SOC'Y S33 (2000). COPD stands for
chronic obstructive pulmonary (or lung) disease. Emphysema is a well-known type of COPD.
*^  In aspiration pneumonia, the food and digestive secretions in the stomach are regurgitated up the
esophagus and down the respiratory tract into the lungs.
'* Gillick, supra note 1, at 206-07; Finucane et al., supra note 2, at 1365-66.
' ' Finucane et a)., supra note 2, at )365-66.
*"/d. at 1367.
*' Gillick, supra note 1, at 207-08.
*^  Id. at 207; Finucane et al., supra note 2, at 1368.
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IL THE ABSENCE OF A SLIPPERY SLOPE
Despite the questionable efficacy of artificial feeding, the use of feeding
tubes is common. In 1995 alone, more than 120,000 PEG tubes were inserted
into patients age 65 or older." A study based on 1999 nationwide data found
that more than a third of nursing home patients with advanced cognitive
impairment had feeding tubes.**^  Concem with overuse of artificial feeding
has spurred two recent, prominent discussions, with both authors concluding
that tube feeding generally should not be used for patients with advanced
dementia." As one of the authors observed, difficulty with eating often is a
sign of end-stage disease and tube feeding cannot stem the progression of
illness at that point.'*' Hand feeding should be attempted, but artificial feeding
generally cannot accomplish anything more for the patient than can hand
feeding.
What is striking about the apparent overuse of feeding tubes is the extent
to which it suggests that patients, families, and physicians have not succumbed
to their freedom to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition from irreversibly
ill patients. In the 1980s, before courts clearly recognized a patient's right to
forgo artificial feeding, ethicists, physicians, and other commentators engaged
in a major debate about the morality of discontinuing nutrition and hydration in
accordance with the patient's wishes. Many opponents of such a right warned
that it would have serious consequences.
Daniel Callahan, for example, wrote that society can easily move from
permitting the withdrawal of artificial nutrition to requiring its withdrawal.
If patients never will regain their mental faculties, and medical care is very
expensive, it is easy for society to conclude that there is no point in trying to
prolong life with a feeding tube.''' Mark Siegler, Alan Weisbard, and others
also expressed concern that cost constraints would transform a right to die by
withdrawal of artificial feeding into a duty to die that way.**
Yet, feeding tubes remain a mainstay ofthe care of patients whose ability
to eat is compromised. The fundamental social ethic in favor of feeding those
who are starving has not been eroded as feared.'' As discussed above, feeding
tubes are used even when they do not benefit the patients who receive them. In
addition, other studies regularly show that physicians find it more difficult to
stop feeding and hydration than to discontinue ventilators, dialysis, or other
" Callahan et al., supra note 3, at 1048.
^ Mitchell et al., supra note 2.
'^ Gillick, supra note 1; Finucane et al., supra note 2.
'* Gillick, supra note 1, at 207.
" Callahan, supra note 5.
'* Siegler & Weisbard, supra note 5; William E. May et al.. Feeding and Hydrating the Permanently
Unconscious and Other Vulnerable Persons, 3 ISSUES L. & MED. 203 (1987).
' ' Callahan, supra note 5; Gilbert Meilaender, On Removing Food and Water: Against the Stream, 14(6)
HASTINGS CEN. REP. 11 (1984).
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life-sustaining treatments™ and also that physicians often are uncomfortable
withholding or withdrawing nutrition, even when doing so is consistent with
the patient's wishes.^'
To be sure, a few commentators have been arguing for a number of years
that some patients ought not be artificially fed or hydrated regardless of the
wishes of the patient or family. According to Schneiderman and Jecker, it is
futile to provide a feeding tube or intravenous line to permanently unconscious
patients, and artificial feeding and hydration should be withheld from such
patients unilaterally,^^ If views like this prevailed, the vision of Callahan,
Siegler, and Wiesbard might be fulfilled. The right to refuse artificial nutrition
and hydration could become a duty to do so. However, the Schneiderman and
Jecker view is a minority position.
The reluctance of physicians and families to discontinue feeding tubes
parallels judicial behavior. Courts also have hesitated to authorize withdrawals
of feeding tubes. Although judges have concluded that artificial nutrition and
hydration are medical treatments in the same way as ventilators or dialysis
and, therefore, have recognized an unqualified right of patients to have artifi-
cial nutrition discontinued, courts also have erected strict procedural mles to
protect incompetent patients from premature withdrawals. When courts are
asked whether feeding can be stopped for a patient who is neither terminally
ill nor permanently unconscious, they consistently respond that feeding must
be given in the absence of very clear evidence that the patient previously
expressed a preference against tube feeding.
The Michigan Supreme Court's decision in In re Martin'^ is a good ex-
ample. Michael Martin was injured in an automobile accident, leaving him
with severe impairment of his intellectual and physical abilities. He could
no longer walk or talk, and was dependent on a PEG tube for his nutrition.
Although there was some disagreement among the medical experts who eval-
uated Mr. Martin, they generally concluded that he could understand some
simple questions but he lacked an understanding of more complex matters
like his physical capabilities and medical condition. They all agreed that his
impairments were permanent.^ "*
Mr. Martin's wife requested that the feeding tube be removed. In her
opinion, he would not have wanted life-sustaining treatment given the severity
of his injuries. In reaching her opinion, Ms. Martin drew on conversations that
she had had with her husband. She testified:
™ David A, Asch et al,. The Sequence of Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatments from Patients, 107 AM,
J, MED, 153(1999),
^' Mildred Z,S, Solomon et al,. Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional Views on Life-Sustaining
Treatments, 83 AM, J, PUB, HEALTH 14 (1999),
^^ LAWRENCE J, SCHNEIDERMAN & NANCY S, JECKER, WRONG MEDICINE; DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND FUTILE
TREATMENT 12(1995),
" 538 N,W,2d 399 (Mieh, 1995),
''^  Id. at 402-04,
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Discussions between Mike and me regarding what our wishes would be if either of
us was ever involved in a serious accident, had a disabling or terminal illness or was
dying of old age, began approximately eight years ago. These discussions occurred
on many different occasions. As I indicate below, several were triggered by movies
which we saw together. Mike's position was always the same: he did not want to be
kept alive on machines and he made me promise that I would never permit it.
Some ofthe conversations that we had about medical care in this context occurred
after we watched movies about people who no longer were mentally competent either
due to illness, accident, or old age; others involved people who could no longer do
anything for themselves, such as persons who lived in a nursing home and could no
longer feed or dress themselves and needed to wear diapers or have other measures
taken to continue existing. Mike stated to me on several occasions: "That's bullshit,
I would never want to live like that." He also said to me, "Please don't ever let me
exist that way because those people don't even have their dignity."...
Some movies that triggered our discussions were about accidents—car accidents,
hunting accidents or other accidents near home or in water. Mike was an avid hunter
and frequently expressed concerned [sic] about a hunting accident. Mike frequently
told me that if he ever had an accident from which he would "not recover" and "could
not be the same person," he did "not want to live that way." He would say, "Mary,
promise me you wouldn't let me live like that if I can't be the person I am right
now, because if you do, believe me I'll haunt you every day ofyour life." I stated my
promise to him and made him promise me the same.'^
The court held that the feeding tube could not be removed from Mr. Martin.
According to the court, prior oral statements by the patient will be sufficient
to justify withdrawal of treatment "[o]nly when the patient's prior statements
clearly illustrate a serious, well thought out, consistent decision to refuse
treatment under these exact circumstances or circumstances highly similar
to the current situation."'* Under this approach, a general refusal of artificial
measures is not sufficient. Rather, patients must have spoken to the particular
medical problem they have and possibly even to the specifics of artificial
feeding. The California, New Jersey, and Wisconsin Supreme Courts also
have adopted strict standards for withdrawing feeding tubes from incompetent
patients who are neither terminally ill nor permanently unconscious."
In the California case of Wendland v. Wendland,^^ Rose Wendland asked
that a feeding tube be withdrawn from her husband, Michael Wendland, two
years after an automobile accident left Mr. Wendland with severe and perma-
nent brain damage.'' He retained some ability to interact with others. As the
court reported:
. at411-12.
. at411.
" Spahn V. Eisenberg, 563 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1997); Wendland v. Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001);/n
re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
'8 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001).
. at 154.
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At his highest level of function between February and July, 1995, Robert was able
to do sueh things as throw and eatch a ball, operate an electric wheelchair with
assistance, tum pages, draw circles, draw an 'R' and perform two-step commands.
For example, "[h]e was able to respond appropriately to the command 'close your eyes
and open them when I say the number 3 . ' . . . He could choose a requested color block
out of four color blocks. He could set the right peg in a pegboard.... He remained
unable to vocalize. Eye blinking was successfully used as a communication mode
for a while, however no consistent method of communication was developed.*"
Despite this residual capacity to interact with people and his envi-
ronment, Mr. Wendland's impairments were quite severe. The court also
observed:
The same medical report summarized his continuing impaiments as follows: "severe
cognitive impairment that is not possible to fully appreciate due to the concurrent
motor and communication impairments . . ."; "maladaptive behavior characterized
by agitation, aggressiveness and non-compliance"; "severe paralysis on the right and
moderate paralysis on the left"; "severely impaired communication, without com-
pensatory augmentative communication system"; "severe swallowing dysfunction,
dependent upon non-oral enteric tube feeding for nutrition and hydration"; "inconti-
nence of bowel and bladder"; "moderate spasticity"; "mild to moderate contractures";
"general dysphoria"; "recurrent medical illnesses, including pneumonia, bladder in-
fections, sinusitis"; and "dental issues."*'
In rejecting the spouse's request that Mr. Wendland's feeding tube be
discontinued, the court emphasized the need for clear and convincing evidence
that Mr. Wendland "would have refused treatment under the circumstances
of this caser*^ Although Mr. Wendland had spoken about his desire not to
live as a "vegetable," he had not disclosed his preferences for treatment when
his medical condition would be superior to the condition of someone in a
persistent vegetative state." The New York Court of Appeals has adopted
similarly strict standards for discontinuing feeding tubes, as well as ventilators
and other treatments, from incompetent patients who are neither terminally
ill nor permanently unconscious (or any incompetent patient).*^
In sum, although the slippery slope was a real risk once courts recognized
a right for patients to have artificial nutrition withheld or withdrawn, the
evidence seems to suggest that, if anything, physicians, families, and judges
have been too unwilling to discontinue the artificial feeding of patients. Indeed,
Id. at 154-55 (quoting from a medical evaluation submitted to the court).
' Id. at 155 (quoting from a medical evaluation submitted to the court).
Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
W.
In re Westchester County Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988). When the patient is terminally
ill or permanently unconsicious, the standards typically are more relaxed. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434
(N.J. 1987); MARK A. HALL ET AL.. HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 544-46 (6th ed. 2003).
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one thing is clear—the freedom to refuse a feeding tube has not become a duty
to do so.
III. ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ABOUT THE ABSENCE OF A
SLIPPERY SLOPE
To be sure, there are alternative theories about the appropriateness of
decisions to stop artificial feeding. The literature reports data on the number
of feeding tubes inserted, but we do not have data on the number of patients
for whom feeding was discontinued or never started. We know that 120,000
PEG tubes were inserted in 1995, but it may be that 820,000 were forgone.
Perhaps physicians and families often are too quick to withhold or withdraw
feeding tubes, and efforts have not been made to document such alacrity.
This altemative explanation probably is not correct. The lack of mean-
ingful benefit from feeding tubes in many patients who receive them is good
evidence that artificial feeding is overused. Moreover, the strict legal rules
for withholding or withdrawing feeding tubes indicate that courts have not
made it too easy for patients to be deprived of nutrition and hydration. Indeed,
nursing homes often are reluctant to discontinue tube feeding for another legal
reason—concern that state regulators will cite them for undernourishing their
patients.*'
It also may be the case that physicians, patients, and families mistakenly
believe that artificial nutrition and hydration provide more benefit than they
actually do provide and that they overuse feeding tubes for that reason. In
this view, as people come to recognize that feeding tubes are less helpful than
expected, they will use them less frequently.
There are a couple of reasons why we cannot attribute the lack of a
slippery slope to misunderstandings about the value of feeding tubes. First,
even if the empirical data on the actual use of feeding tubes are skewed by
misunderstandings, we still have the fact that courts have adopted strict legal
rules for the withdrawal of feeding tubes. More than a decade after the United
States Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to have feeding tubes
withdrawn, the California Supreme Court imposed strict procedural rules for
withdrawing feeding tubes from patients who are neither terminally ill nor
permanently unconscious (in the Wendland case). Second, if families, doctors,
and judges become more willing to stop artificial feeding after learning that
feeding tubes are not beneficial, their willingness would not amount to a slide
down the slippery slope of abuse. Withholding feeding tubes when they would
constitute futile treatment would refiect appropriate medical practice.
Alan Meisel, Barriers to Forgoing Nutrition and Hydration in Nursing Hotnes, 21 AM. J.L. & MED.
335 (1995).
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Note, too, that the existence of misunderstanding about the value of feed-
ing tubes is itself evidence against the existence of a slippery slope with respect
to the withdrawal of feeding tubes. On some matters, people's perspectives
coincide well with reality, and on other matters they do not. Some new infor-
mation is rapidly assimilated.^' With other new information, the assimilation
is very slow. We therefore need to consider why understanding lags behind
reality with respect to the value of feeding tubes. For feeding tubes, we might
explain the gap between use and benefit in terms of what has been called the
"tomato effect." The tomato effect refers to a phenomenon that is the reverse
of what we see with feeding tubes. With feeding tubes, a medical device is
used despite a lack of benefit. With the tomato effect, a medical intervention
is not used despite the likelihood of benefit. The tomato effect takes its name
from the reluctance at one time of Americans to eat tomatoes. Because toma-
toes come from a plant family with poisonous species, Americans assumed
that tomatoes were poisonous, in the face of evidence from Italy that large
consumption of tomatoes was not harmful to one's health." The tomato effect
occurs because empirical evidence is inconsistent with strongly held, preex-
isting beliefs, and the preexisting beliefs trump the empirical evidence.*^ The
overuse of feeding tubes also is an example of strongly held beliefs trumping
empirical data. People believe that feeding tubes are beneficial, and they cling
to their beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence.
Why do people cling to a belief in the value of feeding tubes? Providing
artificial nutrition and hydration to seriously impaired patients ties into social
beliefs about the sanctity of life and the symbolic value of nourishment. Be-
cause the latter belief is fundamentally important, it is not easily disregarded,
even when empirical evidence contradicts it.
For purposes of this article, an important point is that a change in the
law also is not sufficient to shake these important beliefs. Even though the
courts have opened the door to the discontinuation of tube feeding slightly,
the door has not swung open widely.
For example, surgeons were quick to adopt the endoscopic method of gall bladder removal. Within
five years of its introduction, more than 80% of gall bladder removals were performed endoscopically.
NIH Consensus Development Panel on Gallstones and Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, Gallstones and
Laparoscopic Cholecystectomy, 269 J.A.M.A. 1018, 1018(1993).
James S. Goodwin & Jean M. Goodwin, The Tomato Effect: Rejection of Highly Efficacious Therapies,
251 J.A.M.A. 2387, 2387 (1984). Tomatoes belong to the nightshade family of plants, and the leaves
and fruit of several species of the nightshade family can be fatally poisonous.
An example of the tomato effect in medicine includes the reluctance of physicians to use gold in
treating rheumatoid arthritis, even as empirical data reflected gold's effectiveness. It did not make sense
to doctors that a metallic substance would relieve arthritic symptoms. Id. at 2388-89.
4 0 4 ORENTLICHER & CALLAHAN
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ASSISTED SUICIDE DEBATE
The apparent overuse of feeding tubes also has important implications
for the debate about legalizing physician-assisted suicide. With that debate,
too, slippery slope concerns are common, and legitimately so.
While many people oppose physician-assisted suicide under all circum-
stances, a number of commentators observe that there might be some jus-
tifiable cases of assisted suicide.*' For example, if a patient clearly is close
to death from widely metastatic cancer and is suffering severe, unrelenting
pain, assisted suicide might be acceptable. Such a patient could refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, and the right to do so reflects respect for both
patient autonomy and the desire to spare people intolerable suffering.* Both
values also could justify a right to assisted suicide for the patient with widely
metastatic cancer.
In this view, a limited right to assisted suicide might be permissible. A
broad right to assisted suicide could lead to untimely and inappropriate deaths
of depressed persons, but a highly restricted right would allow physicians
to have all necessary options to protect people from intolerable suffering.
Thus, for example, in Oregon the legal right to assisted suicide is a right only
for terminally ill persons. In Oregon, assisted suicide is permitted only for
patients with "an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically
confirmed and will, within reasonable medical Judgment, produce death within
six months."" By pennitting assisted suicide for terminally ill patients and no
one else, Oregon limits the right to the class of persons for whom intolerable
suffering is a real possibility and who do not enjoy the prospect of a medical
cure for their illness.
However, it is argued, even with a limited right to assisted suicide, there
is too great a risk that patients will end their lives non-voluntarily.'^ Patients
desiring assisted suicide may have impaired competence from a treatable
depression, and physicians responding to requests for suicide assistance often
are inadequately trained to distinguish rational requests from those driven
by depression.'^ It is all too easy for a physician to assume that a patient
is very sad because the patient is very sick, that the patient's mood is an
appropriate response to the patient's condition, and that the desire for suicide
*'John D. Arras, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Tragic View, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 361
(1996).
' " DAVID ORENTLICHER, MArrERS OF LIFE AND DEATH: MAKING MORAL THEORY WORK IN MEDICAL ETHICS AND
THE LAW 61-68 (2001).
" OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800(12) (2004).
'^ Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented hy the Compelling, Heartwrenching
Case, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRiMtNOL. 1121 (1998); Ezekiel J. Emanuel, What Is the Great Benefit of
Legalizing Euthanasia or Physician-Assisted Suicide, 109 ETHICS 629 (1999).
" Yeates Conwell & Eric D. Caine, Rational Suicide and the Right to Die: Reality and Myth, 325 NEW
ENG. J.MED. 1100(1991).
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is understandable. However, for many such patients, psychiatric counseling
and/or drug treatment will dissipate the desire to end life.
There are other reasons why a limited right to assisted suicide may
expand. Patients may feel that they have a duty to die to spare their families
the financial and emotional burden of their continued life.''' The cost of medical
care can readily consume hundreds of thousands of dollars for dying patients,
and it can be draining psychologically to care for people in their final months.
Patients also may choose to die because they have not received the kinds
of support services that would make them willing to stay alive. Funding for
care of the disabled always has been precarious. As states and the federal
government face growing budget constraints, it is increasingly likely that
services for people with serious illnesses will be underfunded. Indeed, it is
common for members of the public to complain that too much money is spent
on patients in the final year of life. In short, while a limited right to assisted
suicide may make sense in principle, in practice it easily could be extended
beyond the justifiable cases.
There is no way to know in advance whether legalization of assisted sui-
cide will take us down the slippery slope of abuse. Nevertheless, this country's
experience with the right to refuse artificial nutrition suggests that people in
the United States would not abuse a freedom to end their lives through assisted
suicide. The pressures for assisted suicide also act on patients, families, and
physicians regarding decisions to discontinue life-sustaining treatment. De-
pression, for example, may lead a permanently disabled patient to conclude
that staying alive is meaningless and further treatment is useless. Similarly,
just as inadequate palliative or other care might lead a patient to commit
suicide, it might lead a patient to request the discontinuation of a ventilator,
dialysis, or a feeding tube. Critics of a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
specifically invoke concems about the influence of inadequate care on patient
decision-making.
Economic and emotional burdens on the family are a third kind of pres-
sure that present concems for the discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment,
as well as for assisted suicide. In some ways, they are a more serious pressure
on life-sustaining treatment decisions. The right to assisted suicide typically is
seen as appropriate only for terminally ill patients, while life-sustaining treat-
ment can be needed for many years. Accordingly, the economic and emotional
burdens that can be relieved by stopping a ventilator, dialysis, or a feeding
tube can be much greater than the burdens relieved by assisting the suicide of
someone with a life expectancy of only a few weeks or months.'^
' Yale Kamisar, Are IMWS Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, 23(3) HASTINGS CEN. REP. 32, 39
(1993).
Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED.
512, 513 (1991) (reporting one hospital's bill for more than $700,000 for less than a year's care ofa
patient in a persistent vegetative state).
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In addition, just as the law has developed strict safeguards that have to
he satisfied hefore a feeding tuhe can be withdrawn from incompetent patients
who are neither terminally ill nor permanently unconscious, so, too, is the law
likely to require strict safeguards hefore assisted suicide will be permitted.
Under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, for example, patients cannot engage
in physician-assisted suicide unless they are mentally competent and termi-
nally ill, have expressed their choice of suicide orally and in writing, and have
satisfied a 15-day waiting period.'* The fact that the law has carefully cabined
the right to have feeding tubes withdrawn suggests that it also will carefully
cabin a right to assisted suicide.
In fact, if there are any differences in the law or practice between a
right to refuse treatment and a right to assisted suicide, one would expect a
more restrictive policy with respect to assisted suicide. The participation of
patients and physicians in assisted suicide deaths is viewed as being active, in
contrast to the passive participation that takes place when patients, families,
and physicians decide to discontinue artificial feeding. If people are hesitant
to employ passive measures that lead to a patient's death, they are likely to be
more hesitant to employ active measures that cause death.
The ethical standards of physicians also are an important consideration.
Experience with artificial feeding suggests that physicians are restrained in
their use of life-ending practices by their moral scruples as much as by the
requirements of the law. The studies on tube feeding indicate that physicians
are providing artificial nutrition despite the absence of medical benefit. If the
feeding is not supplying medical benefit, physicians must be relying on the ex-
istence of other benefit. This suggests that physicians are driven substantially
by the symbolic importance of always feeding those who are starving. The
law may no longer recognize that value, but physicians still do. If physicians
approach legalized physician-assisted suicide with a similar attitude, we can
predict that the removal of legal obstacles would not overcome the reluctance
of physicians to help their patients die by suicide. In other words, the profes-
sional ethic in favor of end-of-life care carries great weight independent of
the law.
Data from Oregon support the suggestion that many physicians will hes-
itate to assist a patient's suicide even if permitted to do so by the law. In a study
of physicians' responses to requests for assisted suicide in Oregon, patients
received a prescription in only 18% of the cases, and for 29% of the requests
physicians indicated that they were not willing to provide a prescription for
assisted suicide under any circumstances.''
Death with Digtiity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2004).
Linda Ganzini et al., Physicians' Experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 342 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 557 (2000). Note that the 29% figure is probably an underestimate of the percentage of
physicians who would never assist a patient's suicide. Patients often will have a sense of their physicians'
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Although there is reason to be reassured about the slippery slope in as-
sisted suicide, risks still remain. Important distinctions between withdrawing
a feeding tube and assisting a suicide may make the latter more prone to
abuse. For example, commentators have argued that it is more difficult to de-
tect abuses with physician-assisted suicide than with treatment withdrawal.'*
Treatment withdrawals typically take place in hospitals, where many peo-
ple who would notice irregularities in treatment are involved in the care of
the patient. Physician-assisted suicide, on the other hand, often would oc-
cur in the privacy of the patient's home. In addition, families often will play
a smaller role in decisions about physician-assisted suicide than about treat-
ment withdrawal, leaving them less able to protect patients from overreaching
physicians.
Differences among patients also exist between physician-assisted sui-
cide and treatment withdrawal. However, it is not clear which way those
differences cut. For example, the fact that patients need be competent for
assisted suicide makes that practice less susceptible to abuse than the with-
holding or withdrawing of nutrition and hydration. Commonly, patients who
are candidates for feeding tubes are mentally incapacitated. Still, the impor-
tant point is that we cannot simply generalize from treatment withdrawal to
assisted suicide.
Some commentators cite data from the Netherlands as evidence of the
slippery slope when physicians take death-hastening action. According to
studies of euthanasia in the Netherlands, physicians often do not observe the
country's strict procedural safeguards. In about 25% to 30% of cases involving
euthanasia or assisted suicide, for example, patients had not made the required
explicit and contemporaneous request to have their lives ended.*
However, other commentators respond that the slippage in the Nether-
lands occurs with respect to the letter of the law rather than its spirit. For
example, some patients may not satisfy the requirement of contemporane-
ous and persistent requests to die, but those patients may have given clear
evidence of their wishes before becoming incompetent."* Moreover, alleged
abuses in the Netherlands involve euthanasia rather than assisted suicide,
and euthanasia is more subject to abuse. This difference may explain why
Oregon's experience with legalized assisted suicide does not appear to have
feelings about assisted suicide. If a physician opposes the practice, patients are not likely to request the
physician's assistance.
'^ Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physieian-Assisied Suieide: Creating a Regula-
tory Potemkin Vi//age,30U.RiCH.L.REV. 1 (1996); Carl H. Coleman & Alan R.Fleischman,GMWe/me.s
for Physieian-Assisted Suieide: Can the Challenge Be Met?, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 217 (1996).
" Paul J. van der Maas et al.. Euthanasia, Physieian-Assisted Suieide and Other Medieal Praetices
Involving ihe End of Life in the Netherlands, 335 NEV'/ZNCJ. MED. 1669, 1700-01 (1996).
^^DavidOrent\icher,TheLegalizationof Physieian-Assisted Suieide: A Very Modest Revolution,38B .CL.
REV. 443(1997).
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led to the kinds of abuses claimed with regard to euthanasia in the
Netherlands.'^'
Indeed, data from Oregon are quite reassuring on the question of abuse.
For example, despite fears that there would be a high rate of assisted suicide as
a result of the law, it apparently is used infrequently, with fewer than 0.1 % of
deaths in Oregon taking place by assisted suicide in the first four years after the
law took effect and 0.13% and 0.14% of deaths taking place by assisted suicide
in 2002 and 2003, the fifth and sixth years of the law, respectively.'"^ By any
measure, these are low rates, and they are especially low in comparison with
data from the Netherlands. In that country, assisted suicide occurs more than
three times more frequently and euthanasia roughly 20 times more frequently
than does assisted suicide in Oregon.'"^ In addition to being used sparingly in
Oregon, the right to a legalized form of suicide has not encouraged suicide
among young people in the state.'**
It also is reassuring that physicians appear to be complying with the
requirements ofthe Oregon law'"^ and that decisions to die by assisted suicide
apparently are not being driven by poor education, lack of insurance, or inade-
quate palliative care.""' Physicians also have not been quick to assist a patient's
suicide, granting only 18% of patients' requests for assisted suicide.""
Still, as critics of assisted suicide have observed, there may be abuses
lurking in the Oregon data. We do not know whether patients in Oregon
undergo an adequate psychiatric evaluation,""* whether physicians know their
patients well enough to judge the voluntariness of their decisions,"* or how
careful Oregon physicians are in adhering to the law's requirement that the
"" Amy D. Sullivan et al.. Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon—The Second Year, 342 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 598 (2000); Amy D. Sullivan et al.. Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon, 344
NEW ENG. J. MED. 605 (2001).
'"^ Katrina Hedberg et al.. Five Years of Legal Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon, 348 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 961 (2003); OREGON DEPARTMENT OE HUMAN SERVICES, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON'S DEATH
WITH DIGNITY ACT 11 (2004).
"" van der Maas et al., supra note 99, at 1701 (reporting that 0.4% of all deaths occurred by assisted
suicide and 2.3% of all deaths by euthanasia in the Netherlands in 1995).
'** Barbara Coombs-Lee & James L. Werth, Jr., Observations on the First Year of Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act, 6 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 268 (2000).
'"5 Sullivan et al., supra note 101, at 603; Coombs-Lee & Werth, supra note 104, at 273-74.
"" Sullivan et al., supra note 101, at 602; OREGON DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 102, at 12.
"" Ganzini et al., supra note 97, at 561.
'"^ Coombs-Lee & Werth, supra note 104; Herbert Hendin et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide: Reflections
on Oregon's First Case, 14 ISSUES L. & MED. 243,251-54 (1998). In this regard, assisted suicide patients
in Oregon are much less likely to receive a psychological evaluation now than when assisted suicide was
first legalized. In 1998,31 % of patients had received a psychological evaluation, compared with 5% in
2003. OREGON DEPARTMENT OE HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 102, at 11. Moreover, questions have been
raised about a patient with a long history of depression who received a prescription for a life-ending
dose of barbiturates under Oregon's law, but who died of lung cancer without using the barbiturates.
John Schwartz, Questions on Safeguards in Suicide Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at Al.
" " Wesley J. Smith, Dependency or Death? Oregonians Make a Chilling Choice, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25,
1999, at A18.
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patient be terminally ill to qualify for assisted suicide. We also do not know
whether abuses will become more common over time. We need more data
from Oregon to fill out the picture.
In the end, our discussion cannot provide a complete response to the slip-
pery slope concem. Only more experience with legalized assisted suicide can
answer the question about slippery slope abuses. Nevertheless, our discussion
adds important considerations to the slippery slope analysis,
CONCLUSION
Commentators have rightly expressed concem about the apparent
overuse of feeding tubes. Artificial nutrition is not without side effects, and
it appears that many patients suffer the complications of tube feeding with-
out realizing any countervailing benefit. At the same time, it is important to
recognize the positive message from the data. When cost pressures can make
it too easy to devalue the life of a dying patient, society may benefit from
an ethic that errs on the side of using life-preserving practices beyond their
life-preserving function. In addition, the tendency of patients, families, and
physicians to resist the withholding of artificial nutrition suggests that patients
and physicians also may resist the use of assisted suicide, even if that practice
is legalized.

